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ACCEPTANCE BY INTERVENTION IN BILLS
OF EXCHANGE*
Salvador ltriago
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I
PRELIMINARY REMARKS

I

NTERVENTION is an act whereby a person becomes a party to a

negotiable instrument, whether by accepting the bill or by paying
the sum indicated thereon, in order to relieve one of the ohligors on the
bill from the action of recourse that the holder could assert against him
in consequence of default of acceptance or payment by the drawee.
The complexity of the material to be discussed renders it necessary,
in order to clarify the development of the exposition, for us to advance
several concepts, which will later be considered more fully at the proper
places.
Intervention may be of two kinds, according as it occurs at acceptance ( acceptance for honor) or in payment of a bill (payment for
honor). In both cases, intervention is an auxiliary institution which has
as its ultimate aim the payment of the bill. It is, in short, a guarantee,
because, whatever be the form it takes ( acceptance or payment), the
person who completes the act undertakes the obligation to pay in the
interest of another, being assured of a right of recourse to obtain reinforcement from the party who was subject to demand for the payment,
and for this purpose being subrogated to all the rights belonging to the
h,older -of the bill.
Intervention, either for acceptance or for payment, may assume two
different forms, depending upon whether the drawer or the endorsers
have designated some one to perform these acts in case of need ( referee
in case of need), or whether a person not already a party to the bill
presents himself at the opportune moment to offer his collaboration for
the performance of the negotiatory obligation (intervener). For this
reason, in the course of this work the word intervener will frequently

*

This article is part of a monograph entitled "Acceptance on Bills of Exchange"
prepared by the author in connection with the Research in Inter-American Law at the
University of Michigan, described by Professor Yntema in an article in 43 MICH. L.
REV. 549 (1944). Special acknowledgment is due Miss Anita Uvick of the research staff
for the translation of the present article.-Ed.
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be Jound employed in its broader and more general sense, which comprises both concepts.
To acquire the status of intervener, no special qualities are required.
Bills may be accepted or paid for honor even by persons who already
· appear on the bill as negotiatory obligors, with the sole exception of the
drawee who has· given 4is acceptance. Likewise, this may occur for the
benefit of any of the negotiatory obligors, excluding as a rule the acceptor of the instrument.
.
Our interest in this subject is limited chiefly to what concerns acceptance, since this is the aspect of the institution of intervention most
closely relat~d to the theme of this work.

II
HISTORICAL SURVEY

The foregoing concepts established, let us briefly trace the historical
development and evolution of intervention.
The institution of intervention dates back to the fifteenth century,
according to the authoritative opinion of Martens and Goldschmidt.
Biener, on the contrary, directs attention to sources found by him, which
date from the sixteenth century. It seems that of the two opinions cited,
the former enjoys greater authority, being based on the oldest extant
document of intervention, which was found in the register of the
Genoan notary, Giuliano Canella, and dates as of the year 1413.1
In its first manifestation, intervention assumed the imperfect form
of voluntary intervention in favor of a merchant who, because of having
signed a bill drawn against another person, found himself for this reason
bound to answer for the payment upon-the refusal of the latter. Consequently, in the first stage of the evolution of the institution of intervention, the intervener assumed a character which, because of its similarity
to the negotiorum gestor, has frequently been identified with this legal
category of the common law. This practice spread rapidly, and the advantages that it offered induced the merchants to designate some
friendly person, generally another merchant or a banker, to honor bills
drawn by them in case the drawee, refusing acceptance or payment,
should give occasion for the making of the corresponding protest. 2
To discover the raison d'etre, the very origin of intervention, it is
1 See Arcangeli, "Svolgimento storico dell'intervento cambiario" 10 Riv. D.
CoM., pt. 1 (It., 1912) 220. ,·
• 2 De Turri, cited by GusTAvo BONELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO O DEL CONTRATTO DI CONTO CORRENTE 305, § 157, n. I (Milano, 1930).
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sufficient merely to take account of the prejudicial consequences to the
drawer that fl.ow from the refusal of the drawee to give his acceptance
or to effect payment of the instrument. Dishonor is always attributed to
the drawee's lack of confidence in the solvency of the drawer and not to
the real, true motives that induced him to 'refuse assent. This situation
demonstrates that the desire to save the good name and reputation of a
friend has always exercised a powerful influence in the decision of a
third party to burden himself with the whole weight of the liability
that the cancellation of a negotiatory obligation involves.
Although it is indisputably true that this spirit of cooperation, inborn in every human being, exercised an enormous influence in the birth
and development of the institution of intervention, it is also quite true,
as Baldasseroni says (1796), that the importance and popularity that it
achieved, much greater in former times than in our day, was due i~
great part to the fact that intervention has, for the intervening party, a
profit motive, namely, the right acquired by a party who pays for honor
of a signature, to receive a certain percentage as commission on the sum
for which the bill is drawn, a compensation formerly termed "provision." 8
Nor should one forget in this connection the important role which
the fairs and the great distances to be traversed in moving ,£ram place to
place played in the development of intervention. Commercial transactions of substantial size were effected in the localities where fairs were
held. At these places, bills were negotiated, being for the most part
then drawn "payable at a certain fair," with this object in view.
The distances, aggravated by inadequate means of communication,
. made it practically impossible for the drawer to receive notice of dishonor of bills in time, a circumstance indispensable to enable him to take
all the precautionary measures that the case might require, in order to
avoid losses which a protest might cause. Thus, impelled by the urgent
necessity of finding a remedy for this situation, the merchants and bankers decided to develop a system of mutual collaboration, based on the
trust arising from similarity of negotiations, community or origin, and
long establishment in the same places. In order to execute this plan, as
it were, of mutual protection, nothing proved more adequate than the
institution of intervention. The drawer of a bill, at the same time when
8

PoMPEO BALDASSERONI, LEGG! E COSTUMI DEL CAMBIO OSSIA TRATTATO SULLE
LETTERE DI CAMBIO, 2d It. ed. con Aggiunte dell'Autore, pt. 2, art. XXII, 281
(Firenze, I 796). On the significance formerly given to the word "provision" and to
"lucro de la promsi6n," we refer to the explanations of Dr. Enrique Testa in his work
on Pror:Jisi6n de Fondos, now in preparation as part of the Research in Inter-American
Law at the University of Michigan.
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he designated the drawee, indicated the name of a merchant or banker
in the locality where th~ bill was to be paid, to accept or pay on his account, in case the drawee should refuse to do so. Thus the custom of indicating a referee in case of need origip.ated.
It has been a difficult task to establish an appropriate terminology
distinguishing the different types of acceptance.
From very remote times, the term acceptance or payment for honor
has been employed for acts of intervention that did not require for their
validity prior effectuation of the formality of protest. To those that, on
the contrary, did require the use of this formality, the denomination of
acceptance or payment after protest (supra protest) was given, because
the intervention was supposed to take place in the same act and at the
same time as the protest. In the course of years, both denomi~ations
came to serve indifferently for both phases of intervention. This
phenomenon of fusion, or rather, confusion of terms, finds an explanation in the abandonment suffered by intervention without protest at the
hands of the doctrine and the positive law then in vogue.
The introduction of endorsement may be. considered a decisive factor in the enrichment of the concepts of negotiability, with two new
forms desigm~d to differentiate the practice of intervention. In fact, the
importance and widespread popularity achieved by this institution as a
result of this event gave. rise to the distinction between intervention
made in behalf of the drawer, which was called for honor of the bill,
and intervention in behalf of the endorsers, which was called for honor
of the endorsement.
It has been alleged that the word intervention, taken in its broader
sense, capable of comprising both the case of acceptance and that of
payment, is of rather recent use. However, Martens in the seventeenth
century, had already employed it for such purpose, and in a manner so
precise and fitting as to make several writers think that its use was quite
general during that period.4
The reason that this term has been definitely established by the
different legal systems, is attributed by Arcangeli in part to the convenience resulting from its use, since in a single word it includes the two
cases of acceptance and payment.
From the brief historical account just given, it appears that there
existed from the beginning a certain difference in the' manner of designating intervention, depending on whether acceptance or payment of
a bill was involved. The same could not be said of the distinction be~ See Arcangeli, "L'indicazione al bisogno nel codice di commercio" 16 Riv. D.
CoM., pt. 1 (It., 1918) 134.
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tween intervention by a party designated in case of need an~ voluntary
intervention. Both cases were included under the general rubric of
intervention. Later, what might be called a separatist influence began
to make itself felt, tending to put an end to the existing custom of including among acts of intervention those performed by a referee in case
of need. Its proponents based their position on the idea that the indication of a referee in case of need created merely a subsidiary bill2 there
being, in consequence, substantial identity between the referee and the
principal drawee. This separatist tendency became patent with Scherer,
who distinguished three different kinds of acceptance: (I) by an ordinary drawee, which he calls direct and ordinary acceptance; (2) by a
referee in case of need, considered by him an ordinary acceptance, but
of a subsidiary character; and (3) by an intervener, whether he be the
drawee himself, a designated party, or any third party, which he calls
acceptance for honor.5 Let us see how this problem has been considered
in some continental European legislations.
The provisions of the French Code of Commerce in the section exclusively dedicated to acceptance by intervention,6 are subject to two
basic observations. The first is the absence of rules controlling the acts
performed by a referee in case of need. The silence of the law in this
respect has given rise to a series of problems related to the urgent
necessity of resolving the doubts which frequently have appeared concerning effects that should be attributed to acceptance by a referee in
case of need. As a consequence of the above situation, the doctrine has
divided into different opinions.
First problem. Should the right to demand security be granted the
holder of a bill accepted by a referee in case of need? In considering
this first problem, French doctrine in general answers affirmatively,
c;:onsidering that the provisions of article I 2 8 of the Code of Commerce,
relating to acceptance by intervention, should be applied to this case.
Thaller declares himself a partisan of the contrary opinion, because he
thinks that the referee in case of need is not an intervener according to
the system of the French Code of Commerce; 7 consequently, from the
moment that he signs the bill, all recourse against the guarantors is
extinguished, this being a situation that does not occur in the case of an
ordinary intervention.
6
Scherer, cited by Arcangeli, "Svolgimento storico dell'intervento cambiario"
10 Riv. D. CoM., pt. 1 (It., 1912) 244.
6
Fr.-C. Com., Titre VIII,§ 4, arts. 126, 127, and 128.
7 THALLER, TRAITE ELEMENTAJRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 8th ed., § 1416
(Paris, 1931).
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' Second problem. The second problem is that of determining who is
entitled to preference when a referee in case of need and a third party
not indicated appear at the same. time and offer to accept the bill. Dalloz resolves the situation in favor of the former. According to this
author, the reason is that the referee in case of need acts pursuant to a
mandate, while any other person who intervenes is no more than a
negotiorum gestor, and that between a party who has received authority
to do something and one who acts without any mandate, preference.
must necessarily be given the former. 8
The second observation refers to the right granted to the holder in
case of n~n-acceptance by the drawee, notwithstanding that the instrument has been accepted by an intervener, to proceed by way of recourse
against the drawer and others liable on the bill, in order to obtain the
corresponding security. This solution has been justly criticized on the
ground that it deprives acceptance by intervention of its principal reason
for existence.9 For this reason, some commercial courts in France, in the
course of the discussion of the proposed law which shortly thereafter
became the Code of Commerce of I 807, petitioned the commission in
charge of its revision that the part dealing with acceptance by intervention should ~e entirely suppressed.10
On the other hand, the German W echselordnung of I 848 included
quite specialized provisions for intervention. It combined in a single
chapter all the mat.erial relating to both acceptance and payment for
8

20 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DE LEGISLATION, DE DOCTRINE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE: LETTRE DE CHANGE 185, § 354 (Paris, 1915). Of the same opinion are
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, MANUEL DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 14th ed., 314, § 342
(Paris, 1924). It may be noted that this is a solution that :fits perfectly into civil law
categories but which is not adaptable to the principles that regulate the law of negotiable instruments.
9 Lyon-Caen and Renault say that this is true legally speaking, since in fact the
bearer is satisfied with the aceeptance when it emanates from a solvent person. If he
should exercise his right of rei;ourse in spite of the fact that the party intervening offers
sufficient guarantee, the drawer and endorsers on whom demand is made would have
the right to qbject that the claim on them is not proper, because the holder should not
be able to demand that more than one solvent party be liable, a requirement which has
been duly satisfied. LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, id. at 231, § 246.
·
Here it is pertinent to raise the following question. On what principle of law could
the drawer or endorsers support this exception against the holder of the bill? The
statute does not differentiate, On the contrary, it expressly establishes the right of the
holder to proceed by way of recourse in default of acceptance by the drawee, notwithstanding any acceptance by intervening parties. (Fr.-C. Com., art. 128: " ••• nonobstant toutes acceptations par intervention.")
10 OBSERVATIONS DES TRIBUNEAUX DE CASSATION ET D'APPEL, DE TRIBUNEAUX
ET CoNSEILS DE CoMMERCE, ETC. suR LE PROJET DE CoDE DE CoMMERCE. Vol. II,
pt. I, 85; pt. II, 538.
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honor without making any distinction between the intervention of a
referee in case of need and that of any third party. As a result, it has
been clearly recognized in German law, that either party, accepting or
paying a bill of exchange dishonored by the drawee, performs an act of
intervention.11
Italian legislation until the Code of Commerce of 1865 reproduced
literally the provisions of the French Code of Commerce. In 1869, a
special commission was appointed to study the reforms needed in the
code referred to, and especially those relating to the law of negotiability. The basic principle that predominated the proceedings of the codifying commission in connection with the subject of intervention was to
maintain absolute separation between acceptance by a third party and
that by a referee in case of need, on the ground that the latter is merely
a subsidiary drawee and the former constitutes the only genuine intervener.
The chamber of commerce of Milan was not very favorably disposed toward the reforms proposed in the first draft, on which account
it made several observations adverse thereto; among these, the comment emphasizing the unenviable situation in which the referee in case
of need would be placed by assimilation to the drawee, is outstanding.
In e:ffect, by placing both on the same level, the referee, like the
drawee, would have no, action on the bill against the party in whose
favor the intervention was made, but would remain liabl~ to such action
at his suit.
As a consequence of the foregoing observations, the second draft
appears to have been inspired along the general lines of the principles
adopted by the German ordinance. Nevertheless, the influence of the
first tendency, which had taken deep roots in the mind of the Italian
legislator, did not disappear completely in the second draft nor in the
Code of Commerce of 1882.12
All the disadvantages noted in the codes of commerce of France and
Italy have been eliminated at present by the incorporation into their
respective legislations of the principles that govern in the Geneva Uniform Law.
The poirit just considered provoked extensive discussions at the
Geneva Conference of 1930. The debates were initiated upon the
declaration of the Dutch delegate, Molengraa:ff, who expressed himself
in favor of the idea of not considering a referee in case of need an in11

Ger.-Wechselordnung, arts. 56-61.
See Arcangeli, "Svolgimento storico dell'intervento cambiario" 10 Riv. D.
CoM., pt. I (It., 1912) 250-252.
12
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tervener, since the latter is a person who offers to do what the holder
has unsuccessfully demanded of the drawee, such act being in contradiction to the position of a referee as a subsidiary drawee, designated as
such by the drawer, against the possibility that the ordinary drawee
should refuse acceptance or payment. A party designated in case of
need does not ·offer to accept nor to pay; but, on the other hand, the
holder of the instrument is bound to require of him the performance of
these acts. If the referee in case of need is disposed to accept or pay, the
holder cannot refuse his offer. On the contrary, if the referee refuses,
the holder is bound to proceed exactly as if there were a refusal to accept or to pay on the part of the drawee; he must, therefore, make the
corresponding protest, which will permit him to enforce his rights of
recourse against the remaining obligors.15
The. opinion set forth above was refuted by the Italian delegate,
Arcangeli. For him, the problem stated by the Dutch delegate presents two different aspects: the one of substance and the other of form
or terminology, which should be considered separately and in an appropriate m,anner.
As respects the substance, the postulate of the delegate from the
Netherlands, by whom, as previously stated, the reference in case of
need is regarded as a subsidiary drawee, is not accepted by Arcangeli.
In the latter's opinion, the viewpoint resulting therefrom does not entirely conform to the actual facts, because when a drawer draws a
bill on the drawee, he generally does so, taking into consideration the
credit that he has against him. If the drawee accepts, he would be
under obligation on the bill to the drawer, while, if the drawer or any
one of the other obligors designates a referee in case of need, he does
so not on account of a pre-existing debt, but in the hope of obtaining the
referee's signature, an acceptance in case of emergency, in order to
avoid the effects that refusal to accept would produce. In this case, if
the party designated accepts, the drawer would not f1ave an action on
the bill against him. Stich action is available only in favor of the party
who follows immediately after the person in behalf of whom the inter-'
vention took place and of the remaining subsequent obligors.
Nevertheless, the reference in case of need should. not be completely identified with a third party intervener who accepts, since the
holder is under obligation to receive an acceptance offered by the
former, without, therefore, having a right of recourse against the parties secondarily liable, since from the fact that such intervention is
18

Geneva, 1930,

2

Acts 308.
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specified in the bill itself, it is supposed to be in the cognizance and to
have the approval of the holder. On the other hand, in the second case,
the holder may refuse acceptance and preserve his rights to proceed
against the other parties liable on the bill.
As for the second aspect of the problem, Arcangeli observes that the
terminology used varies widely in all legislations. It is true that a
referee in case of need who accepts is an intervener; consequently, this
character may be ascribed to him as well as to the spontaneous intervener, as has been done in the Anteproyecto of the Hague, but the
effects of their respective acts must be kept separate, as the Hague Convention of 19ro provides. This system was adopted by the Uniform
Law of Geneva in Chapter VIII thereof.14
It is believed that, for practical purposes, a referee in case of need,
like any third party, should be considered an intervener. We base this
assertion upon the very definition of the institution of intervention, acceptance 0r payment of a bill of exchange by a third party; in our
opinion, the one is as much a third party as the other. Moreover, it
should be recalled that the legal characteristics of intervention by a
referee in case of need and intervention by an undesignated thirq. party
have a common origin, having both arisen from the same source,
namely, the necessity of avoiding recourse in case of the drawee's failure to accept or to pay.
Yet it must not be forgotten that there are some differences between
the two forms of intervention, differences that have their raison d'etre
in the manner in which these two legal processes present themselves in
the complex of negotiatory obligations. In effect, since a referee appears
designated on the bill, in this case intervention must be solicited by the
holder of the instrument; contrariwise, in the second case, there is no
need to make the request, since the intervention is offered by the third
party. These differences, as Bracco affirms, merit emphasis only at the
moment preceding the act of intervention. After this act has been accomplished, they no longer have significance, because the intervener,
whether or not a referee in case of need, acquires the same rights or assumes the same duties on the bill. Therefore, if the distinction be maintained within the necessary limits, it is logical, concludes the author
cited, to combine the two types under the broader category of intervention in general.15
14

Ibid.

BERTO BRAcco, LA LEGGE UNIFORME SULLA CAMBIALE 242, § 137 (Padova,
1935). Pontes de Miranda is of the same opinion. According to him, reference in
case of need is one of the forms that intervention may take. He says, in effect, that
15
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From what has been explained above, it may be deduced that the
purpose of intervention is to obviate the holder's setting in motion the
action of recourse provided in case of non-acceptance or non-payment
of the bill, as well as to avoid all the expense and uncertainty that such
dishonor involves. It might also be remarked that one of its purposes is
to prolong the life of the negotiable instrument by facilitating its negotiability, in the event it is paralyzed as a result of having been dishonored by the drawee.
'
Acceptance may be of two different kinds: ordinary acceptance and
extraordinary acceptance or acceptance for honor. Acceptance for honor
in turn presents two different aspects according to the person intervening. If the intervener has been designated in the bill against the case
of dishonor by the drawee, the bearer has some one to whom he may
resort for acceptance, and the intervention is termed reference in case
of need ( intervenci6n indicada o por indicaci6n). In case the situation is
that such reference has not been made and a third party voluntarily
offers to accept the bill, then it would be a case of free intervention or
intervention proper.
Thus intervention may take place· in two different situations·:
( r) when a drawee, for one reason or another, refuses to accept a bill
· drawn against .liim and ( 2) when an acceptor fails to honor the undertaking to pay the bi~ the day of its maturity. In the first case, there is
acceptance for honor and, in the second, payment for honor.
To explain the legal nature of intervention, the writers have
evolved various theories which may now be considered.
In the past, recourse was had to the theory of gestio negotiorum to
explain the legal nature of intervention. Frank and Siegel in Germany,
Pardessus in France, and De Turri in Italy may be cited as supporters
of this legal doctrine. The conception proved inadequate, since it failed
to explain the commercial effects of the institution and the rights created
in favor of the in~ervener; this is understandable as the activities of a
gestor negotiorum could not produce actions other than of a civil
character.16
,
The doctrine then resorted to the idea of attributing to the act of
intervention may: be stipulated by the drawe~, by the endorser, or by an avaliste, designating the person to pay or accept the bill in case of need. Id. at 250, § 6. To the same
effect: 2 LoRENzo MossA, DERECHO MERCANTIL, translation of Felipe de J. Tena 639,
§ 612 (Buenos Aires, 1940); GuISEPPE VALERI, DIRITTO CAMBIARIO ITALIANO 184;
§ 199 (Milano, 1938).
16 z MossA, DERECHo MERCANTIL, translation of Felipe de J. Tena, 641, § 615
(Buenos Aires, 1940) ; I PONTES DE MIRANDA, LETRA DE CAMBIO 249, § 5 (Rio de
Janeiro, 1937).
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intervention the character of a subsidiary and accessory bill of exchange.
This new thesis acquired great importance as a result of its adoption by
the Leipzig Conference. However, the authority that it achieved was
but transitory, for it could not withstand critical attacks. In fact, it was
objected that the drawee, whatever his condition, from the moment that
he accepts a bill is liable not only to the holder but also to the drawer,
without acquiring in turn any action on the bill against him. Now, if it
be supposed that intervention is to be equated with the acceptance of a
new bill of exchange, it would follow that the intervener, in this case
the acceptor, would find himself deprived of his action on the bill
against the drawer, which is one of his essential guarantees. On the
other hand, it was asked what party intervening ·would accept a bill
without obtaining at the same time some negotiatory guarantee against
the drawer? This danger, as certain authors have thought, could be
avoided by providing the referee in case of need, the ·same as the principal drawee, with the corresponding cover. It does not seem to the
writer wise to complicate further the mechanism of intervention by
injecting therein the legal complexities and practices which such provision of funds implies. Therefore, it may be concluded with Arcangeli:
The remedy would be so serious and cost~y, that it would not
be worthwhile to adopt it, and to make reference in case of need a
subsidiary bill would be tantamount to decreeing its death.17
The subsidiary bill hypothesis having been invalidated for the
reasons just indicated, it was sought to replace it with a new theory that
conceives in the act of intervention the product of a mandate conferred
by the drawer upon the party designated as intervener. By accepting
under such circumstances, the intervener acquiesces in the offer which
has been made to him, the contract of mandate being thus completed.18
The above conception has proved inadmissible from any point of
view. In order that a declaration of intention should constitute an offer
of a mandate, it is necessary that the acceptance thereof should result in
the conclusion of a contract of mandate, a circumstance which does not
17 "L'indicazione · al bisogno nel codice di commercio" I 6 Riv. D. CoM., pt. I
(It., 1918) 495. In discussing the distinction sought to be established between acceptance by a person designated as referee in case of need and acceptance by a persoh
not so designated, the former considered a party extraneous to the institution of intervention, we shall have occasion to refer to this theory which has served as a basis for the
distinction in question.
18
4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, MANUEL DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 14th ed., 94,
§ 98 (Paris, 1924); 3 CESARE V1vANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL, Spanish
version of the 5th Italian edition, with 3d volume translated by Manuel Cabeza y Anido,
Ist ed., 334, No. n92 (Madrid, 1936).
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occur in the case of intervention. The acceptance by a referee in case of
need is binding in itself without taking into consideration the offer contained in the reference. This happens, for example, in the cases where
the signature that accompanies the reference is forged, or where the
reference has been made for acceptance of part of the sum, and the
referee accepts for the total. On the contrary, in the field of contracts
under the common civil law, an acceptance binds the one party who
gives it only when an offer really exists and when he agrees to it in all
its terms.
Another factor that contributes to the tendency to consider the mandate thesis inadequate as an explanation of the legal construction of
intervention, is the freedom enjoyed by the intervener to choose from
the different obligors the one in whose favor he is to give his acceptance,
and, in case he does not exercise this power, there is a conclusive pr~sumption (juris et de jure) that the intervention has taken place for the
benefit of the drawer. The existence of this presumption reveals the
slight importance which, as has been said, is given in the matter of
intervention to agreement of intentions between the party who makes
the offer and the party who accepts it, though such agreement is consid~red, on the other hand, of capital importance for the creation of a
contract of mandate. 19 Here we might add what Mossa has so appropriately said: mandate, solicitation, or authorization are not basically
more than species of subsidiary bills. 20
The most recent theory, which this writer accepts, characterizes the
legal nature of the institution of intervention as a unilateral act. In effect, the presumed explanation of its nature by means of any ordinary
type of contract is to ignore the subst~ntial differences between negotiatory and extra-negqtiatory relationships, differences recognized today
by all writers, which are a logical consequence of that process of distinction, which has been observed over a long period of time, between the
ordinary commercial law and the law relating to bills of exchange and
instruments of credit in general, and which has culminated in the formation of a legal structure of a highly specialized nature, known as negotiable instruments law.
Therefore, we conclude that intervention, whether it proceeds from
a referee in case of need or from any third party without the occurrence
19
See Arcangeli, "Svolgimento storico dell'intervento cambiario" 10 Riv. D.
CoM., pt. 1 (It., 1912) 220.
20
MossA, DERECHO MERCANTIL, translation of Felipe de J. Tena, 642, § 615
(Buenos Aires, 1940).
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of designation in writing, is a unilateral legal act emanating from the
freely expressed will of the intervener, which binds him on the instrument; as such, intervention is an act that enjoys complete autonomy. 21
To present a case for intervention, it is not necessary that there
should be a protested bill. It is merely required that the holder's right
to proceed by way of recourse should have come into being, before or at
the maturity of the instrument, irrespective of what may have been the
cause occasioning dishonor.
For a long time, it was considered that the institution of intervention was irrevocably attached to the formality of protest. That is to
say, it was not possible to conceive the idea that intervention may be
effected without previously making protest for non-acceptance or nonpayment. In the contrary case, the act of a third party intervening was
considered marginal intervention as a concept of negotiable instruments.22 It could not be affirmed, however, that such was the dominant
view from early times. On the contrary, in the most remote period of
their existence, acceptance and payment for honor took place without
taking any account at all of the act of protest.23
In the uniform law, there is a return to the old practice of permitting intervention without requiring protest as a previous formality.
Thus, in theAvant project of a uniform law of 1910 approved at The
Hague, it is provided for both acceptance and payment for honor that
such acts may occur after a protest has been drawn and even without the
necessity of such formality, when the bill contains the clause "without
recourse" (sin garantia ).24 Later, the Uniform Regulation of 1912 and
the Unifo911 Law of 1930 still further enlarged the foregoing provision
to the extent just indicated, namely, by the general principle that intervention may take place whenever there is an occasion for the holder of
an instrument to exercise his right of recourse. 25 Consequently, according to the respective provisions of the codifications mentioned above, a
party who seeks to acquire the character of an intervener may present
himself for this purpose at the opportune moment, that is, when the
drawee refuses to accept or when for any other reason there is default of
acceptance, without the necessity of proving the refusal or default by
• 21 In the same sense as the text: MoSSA, ibid.; I PoNTES DE MIRANDA, LETRA DE
CAMBIO 249, § 5( Rio deJaneiro, 1937).
_
22 With respect to this, see Arcangeli, "Svolgimento storico dell'intervento cambiario" IO Riv. D. CoM., pt. l (It., 1912) 223.
23 Ibid.
24 Arts. 3 l and 68.
25
The Hague-Reglamento Uniforme, arts. 55 and 58.
Geneva-Ley Uniforme, arts 56 and 59.
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means of protest. The proof of such facts may be made by any mode
of evidence.26

III
AMERICAN LEGISLATIONS

To facilitate the study of intervention in the different American
legislations, the material set forth below is classified accqrding to the
topics of greatest interest, relating to this institution, from the point of
view of comparative law.
It is necessary to point out that the legislations, though not identical,
fall into relat\!d groups that exhibit a certain uniformity in basic principles.
A. Intervention and Reference in Case of Need

In the legislations of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, a referee in case of need is considered an intervener just as any undesignated third party, in spite of
the fact that the provisions relative to referees in case of need are not
placed in the sections relating to intervention.27
•
However, the Argentine commentator Segovia maintains:
The designation of a person as an alternate to the drawee
(an eventual drawee), contains a contingent authority (delegaci6n
eventual) to pay and constitutes a contingent bill, ·bound to the
original.28
The writ'er does not adhere to Segovia's opinion, because in his
judgment the quality of an intervener is clearly and expressly attribu~ed by the law to a refere~ in case of need.20 Article 696 of the Code
of Commerce of Argentina provides:
26

Cf. supra note 25.
See: in Argentina: JuliN CARLOS REBoRA, LETRAS DE CAMB10: SoBRE LEGISLAc16N AltGENTINA, 3d ;ev. ed., 256, § 187 (Paris, 1928); 2 MANUEL OBARRIO, CuRso
DE DERECHO coMERCIAL, new edition adapted to the C6digo de Comercio reformado, 2d ed., 352, § 229 (Buenos Aires, 1924); Paraguay: 3 Luis A. ARGANA, TRATADO DE
DER.ECHO MERCANTIL 240, § 1710 (Asuncion, 1937); Chile: 2 ARTURO DAVIS, LA
LETRA DE CAMBIO 50, § 174 (Santiago de Chile, 1928); 2 PALMA RoGERS, DERECHO
COMERCIAL 419 (Santiago de Chile, 1940). ,
28
2 L1sANDRO SEGOVIA, ExPLICACioN Y CRITICA DEL NUEVO C6DIGO DE CoMERCIO DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 142, n. 2200 (Buenos Aires, 1933).
29
Similar provisions:
Para.-C. Com., art. 696.
Uru.--C. Com., art. 889.
Chile--C. Com., arts. 699 and 738.
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 410.
Hon.--C. Com. arts. 549 and 597.
C. R.-L. Cam., art. 90.
27
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On the protest of a bill of exchange for want of acceptance or
payment, any third party may be admitted to accept or to pay the
bill for the account or honor of the drawer or of any party liable
for payment, even though he be not authorized to do so.
The drawer himself, or any other party liable on the bill, may
offer to accept or to make payment.80
By the phrases "any third party" and "even though he be not authorized to do so," it is clearly indicated that the referee in case of
need also acts as an intervener whe"n, having been duly authorized so to
act, he accepts or pays a bill of exchange.
This is the only interpretation that can logically be given to a clause
of this nature. For a long time, as is known, the idea was predominant
in the doctrine that intervention on request _presupposes a real mandate
under the law of negotiable instruments for the acceptance and payment
of a bill, and that, on the other hand, voluntary intervention does not
presuppose an agreement or mandate nor a prior request on the part of
the holder of the instrument. In view of this duality of concepts respecting the legal nature of intervention prevailing in the doctrine generally and especially in the Argentine doctrine,81 it is logical to suppose
that the legislator intended to declare by the use of the clause in question that intervention also may occur in the second case indicated above.
In a second category, may be grouped those legislations that provide for intervention without qualification, but do not refer to stipulations by the drawer or one of the endorsers, that in case of necessity the
bill is ·to be presented for acceptance or payment to the person designated therein for the purpose.
The positive laws of Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, which thus regulate only intervention in the literal sense, admit
of certain doubts with respect to spontaneous intervention.
Here arises a question of considerable importance, whether in these
legislations spontaneous intervention must be understood to be prohibited. Pontes de Miranda, referrjng to the Brazilian law, says that it
80 "Protestada una letra de cambio por falta de aceptaci6n 6 de pago, cualquier
tercero puede ser.admitido a aceptar 6 pagar la letra por cuenta u honor del librador d
de cualquiera de los obligados al pago, aun cuando no se halle autorizado para ese acto.
"El mismo librador, 6 ,cualquiera otro obligado a las resultas de la letra, puede
ofrecerse para aceptar 6 verificar el pago."
81
2 MANUEL OBARRIO, CuRSo DE DERECHO COMERCIAL, new edition adapted
to the C6digo de Comercio reformado, 2d ed., 352, § 229 (Buenos Aires, 1924);
JuAN CARLOS REBoRA, LETRAS DE cAMBio: SoBRE LEGISLAc16N ARGENTINA, 3d rev.
ed., 256, § 186 (Paris, 1928); 4 CARLOS MALAGARRIGA, C6DIGO DE CoMERCIO
COMENTADo, 3d ed., 334, § 306 (Buenos Aires, 1928).
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should not be so considered. It is simply, that, lacking appropriate
sanction, designations by a drawer, endorsers, or avalistes would in the
majority of cases be without any significance. 32 Deoclecio de Campos,
Brazilian delegate to the Geneva Conference, declared in one of the sessions of the conference that Brazilian law envisages the institution of
intervention in its two different aspects: intervention on request, or what
is the same thing, intervention by a referee in case of need, and spontaneous or voluntary intervention. 33
Carvalho de Mendon~a declares himself a partisan of the opposite
view. The law, he says, simplifying this problem of the law of negotiability (i.e., whether a reference must be taken in the sense of a request to honor the signature of the drawer in case of necessity or as a
simple authority to pay), permits the drawer to name two or more
drawees~ It does not specifically state that in case of need the bearer
should have recourse to the additional parties designated. The bearer
must address himself to the first person named and, only in case of the
latter's failure or refusal to accept, to each one of the others, provided
they are domiciled in the same place, in the order of their designation.
He concludes from this that intervention on request or demand does not
exist in Brazilian law, that it admits only spontaneous intervention. 34
The foregoing reasoning is applicable only in cases in which the
designation originates with the drawer. But, what should be the decision
when the designation emanates from an endorser or an avaliste? Such
a referee in case of need could not be considered one of several drawees
indicated, since power to designate alternative drawees belongs only to
the drawer.
A further reason leads this _writer to accept the thesis of Pontes de
Miranda, which is as follows. Article 34 of Decreto 2044 says that in
proceedings ( acto) to protest for failure or refusal to accept, the bill
may be accepted by a third person, with the consent of the possessor or
bearer. As may easily be appreciated, far from prohibiting reference in
case of need, the law leaves a most ample margin for its employment by
saying that "a bill may be accepted by a third party." In effect, the referee in case of need may be a person foreign to the negotiatory relationship, and it is equally clear that a drawee does not become an integral
part thereof until the moment of making his declaration. For this reason, he too must be included within the sphere of application of this
1 PoNTES DE MIRANDA, LETRA DE CAMBIO 250, § 6 (Rio de Janeiro, 11937).
Geneva, 19 3o, Acts 3 12.
a,i, CARVALHO DE MENDON9A, TRATADO DE DIREITO COMMERCIAL BRASILEIRO,
3d ed., pt. 2, 235, § 619 (Rio de Janeiro, 1938).
32

33
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statutory provision. A similar observation may be made on articles 43 8,
r 24, and 126 of the codes of commerce of Bolivia, Haiti, -and the
Dominican Republic, respectively.
In the Anglo-American system in force in the United States, Canada, Colombia, and Panama, the institution of intervention includes
both voluntary intervention and intervention by a referee in case of
need. The chapter dealing with form and interpretation of bills of exchange contains a provision authorizing either the drawer or the endorsers to insert in a bill the name of a person to whom the holder may
resort in case the bill should be dishonored by non-acceptance or nonpayment.35 If such person accepts or pays the bill, he becomes an
acceptor or payor for honor.36

B. Qccasion for Intervention
In Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Costa Rica, the time at which intervention is to occur is directly
related to the proceedings ( diligencia) taken in course of protest. It is
required that acceptance or payment by intervention must take place in
the act of making protest on refusal of the drawee to accept or pay, and
thai: it should be mad~ to appear after such act under the signatures of
the intervener and the notary who was present in the proceeding, with a
statement of the name of the person in whose favor the intervention is
made. 37
Similarly, in the legislations of Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic, it is required that, to be valid, an intervention
must be preceded by the execution of formal protest and that it must
be made to appear following said act under signature of the intervener
and authorization of the notary.
In Peru, protest is not required as a prerequisite for acceptance for
honor (though it is for payment for honor, article 485), but it is neces35

U. S.-N.I.L., s. 131.
Can.-B.E.A., s. 33.
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, art. 133.
Pan.-L. 52 of 1917, art. 131.
36
BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTES, Hornbook Series,
977, § 239 (1943).
37
Arg.-C. Com., art. 697.
Para.-C. Com., art. 697.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 890.
Hon.-C. Com., art. 597.
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 414.
In Chile, articles 73 8 and 748, and in Costa Rica, article 90, require simply
that the bill have been previously protested.
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sary that a person who accepts in this manner should require of the
holder the certificate ( acta) of the protest for non-acceptance, in order
to transmit it as quickly as possible to the person for whose honor he
has accepted (article 459). We may suppose that the object of 'this
rule was to provide a means of notifying the p~rson favored by the intervention that has occurred, as is pro_vided by article 58 of the German
W echselordnung, but, in contrast thereto, the Peruvian law lacks a
sanction applying in case this formality is omitted, a circumstance that
tends to reduce it to a merely optional provision.
In the Mexican law, in order that intervention may validly tak1e
place, previous formality of pr~test is specifically required (article 102
and 134). The obligation to consent to acceptance for honor rests.on the,
holder, only when it is offered by a referee in case of need (article 103).
The law imposes upon the acceptor for honor•the duty of indicating the
person in whose favor he intervenes, under penalty of having the intervention considered in favor of the drawer, even when the .designation
was made by an endorser ( article 104).
In the Anglo-American law, intervention takes place after protest
has been made for non-acceptance or non-payment or for better security. Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable' Instruments Law, the
protest was considered optional for the ·holder in the last case mentioned. If, through negligence, he failed to comply with this formality,
. such omission did, not affect in the least the rights to which he was
entitled against the parties secondarily liable.88

C. Requirements
Respecting the manner in which reference is to be made in Argentina, Segovia says that "it is usually made in a separate document, because it prejudices the credit of the drawee and even of the drawer,
and perhaps even that of the bill itself." 39 To admit such a view would
be to agree that the obligation that is imposed upon the holder by article
656 (t9 present the bill t<? the referee in case of need1 under penalty of
forfeiting the right of recourse against the party who made the designation), which is a negotiatory obligation, could originate in a clause outside of the bill of exchange.
88

.

'

STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE, 3d ed., 306,
§ 255 (1853).
·
89 "La indicaci6n de una persona en subsidio del librado (librado eventual),
contiene una delegaci6n eventual de pago y constituye una letra eventual, vinculada
a la original." 2 LISANDRO SEGOVIA, EXPLICACION Y CRITICA DEL NUEVE CoDIGO
DE CoMERCIO DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 142, n. 2200 (Buenos Aires, 1933).
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One of the dominant principles in the law of negotiability establishes that any obligation of this type must have its origin or source in
the instrument itself. As a consequence, how could the holder of a bill
be bound to present it for acceptance to a_ referee in case of need if such
requirement is not contained therein? Designation by separate document can serve only to justify reparation for the damages which failure
to present the bill may have caused the party making the reference,
but not to deprive the holder of his right to proceed by way of recourse
against him.
As respects the form of intervention, in Anglo-American law it is
required as an indispensable requisite for the validity of an acceptance
for honor that it be written, but not necessarily on the instrument itself.
This is understood to be so, because in Anglo-American law there is no
principle respecting ordinary acceptance, which requires that such act
should be effected in the instrument itself. Consequently, by analogy,
acceptance for honor in a separate document must also be admitted.
The Canadian law differs from this system, providing in article I 5 I :

"An acceptance for honour supra protest, in order to be valid,
must be
"(a) written on the bill, and indicate that it is an acceptance
for honour; and,
"(b) signed by the acceptor for honour."
It is also declared an essential requisite that the intervener expressly
state that he is accepting for honor. Frankly, the writer fails to see the
utility of this last requirement. It is sufficient simply that the party intervening state in whose favor he does so, and in case he omits this
formality, he remains liable at all events on the bill in favor of the
drawer.
As a condition of valid intervention in Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay, it is not required that the intervener be a person entirely
foreign to the relation represented by bill. Therefore, not only may
any third party be allowed to accept or pay a bill in honor of the drawer
or of one of the other obligors, but even these same secondary obligors
may be designated or may voluntarily offer to accept or to make payment ..to
On thi~ point, the legislations of Chile, El Salvador, Honduras,

a

.to Arg.-C.

Com., art. 696.
Para.-C. Com., art. 696.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 889.
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and Costa Rica cliffer from those just mentioned by requiring, as an
indispen,sable condition for intervention, that the intervener be a third
party.41
The Code of Commerce of Peru follows the German W echselordnung on this point. It differs from the rules formulated by the Uniform Regulation of The Hague, in the respect that, in voluntary
intervention, it admits as acceptors only those persons who are not
liable on the bill (article 456). On the other hand, for reference in case
of need, it provides simply, without making any distinction, that a bill
may be accepted for honor "by persons indicated therein for acceptance
and payment in case of ne_ed." (article 455).
This code also distinguishes between the two types of acceptance
in respect to the effects which each one produces, by prescribing in
article 456 that a voluntary acceptance will nevertheless not deprive the
holder of his right of recourse to obtain security for the_ value of the
bill, unless it appears in the act ( acta) of the protest that he consented
to said acceptance.
Acceptance for honor in the Anglo-American system may be given
by any person, provided that he has no connection with the relationship
on the bill, and in favor of any of those liable thereon. Payment for
honor, on the contrary, may be made by any person, not even excepting
the ordinary acceptor, and in favor of any of the obligors, whatever
their status may -be.42 Intervention may be for part of the sum only,
there being in such case the possibility of a subsequent intervention by
a different person and in honor of another one of the parties.48
In Brazil, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, it is provided that
acceptance by intervention may be given only by third parties who have
no relation to the bill, and in favor of the drawer or one of the endorsers.
The Bolivian Mercantile Code departs from the rule just stated
41

Chile-C. Com., art. 739.
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 410.
Hon.-C. Com., art. 597.
C. R.-L. Cam., art. 90.
42
U. S.-N.I.L., ss. 161 and 171.
Can.-B.E.A., ss. 147 and 153.
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, arts. 162 and 172.
Pan.-L. 52 of 1917, arts. 161 and 171.
48
U. S.-N.I.L., s. 161.
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, art. 162.
. Pan.-L. 52 of 1917, art. 161.
The Canadian law provides simply that acceptance by intervention may take
place for part of the sum ( s. l 48) .
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by providing in article 43 8 that anyone is permitted to intervene in behalf of the drawer or any one of the endorsers.

D. Position of the Holder
According to the codes of commerce of Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay, the holder is not bound to admit an acceptance for honor. It
is left to his free discretion whether to agree to it or not.44 In the
countries named, the writer thinks that, in spite of the generality of the
terms employed, it being stated that "the bearer is not bound to agree
to acceptance for honor ... ," the rule is applicable only in case of voluntary intervention, since otherwise the rule concerning referees in case of
need would become a decorative conceit without any effect. In effect,
in these legal systems, it is respectively provided that in bills with
designations made by the drawer or endorsers for cases of need, the
bearer m,,ust, after protest has been made, solicit acceptance or payment
from the individuals named in the designations, under penalty of remaining liable for all the costs of protest and re-exchange and forfeiting
his right to claim recourse against the party who made the designation,
until it appears that the requirement ( diligencia) has been accomplished.45 If, then, the holder be allowed the power to refuse acceptance
by the referee, what use can the application of the above stated rule
have? More than that, the holder would find himself in an absurd
situation in having to demand performance of an act in order to reject
the same so soon as it should be offered hfm.
In Costa Rica, no such inconvenience arises because the Ley de
Cambia in article 90 provides that the intervention of a third party who
offers to accept the bill, shall be permitted, provided that the bearer
agrees thereto. In Chile and Honduras, the rule differs. The holder_ is
bound to admit the acceptance of the intervener in both cases.46 In
El Salvador, on the other hand, the holder has complete freedom to
decide according to his convenience in both cases.47
In Anglo-American law, it is believed that, in spite of refusal by the
drawee to accept, the holder is invested with the right to demand pay" Arg.-C. Com., art. 700, par. 2.
Para.-C. Com., art. 700, par. 2.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 893, par. 2.
C. R.-L. Cam., art. 90.
·
45
Arg.-C. Com., art. 656.
Para.-C. Com., art. 656.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 851.
46
Chile--C. Com., arts. 699 and 738.
Hon.-C. Com., arts. 549 and 597. •
47 El Sal.-C. Com., arts. 410 and 411.
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ment of the drawee, who is the person appearing in the bill as designated for that purpose by the drawer; but the writer does not conceive
that there exists a duty and much less that an acceptor for honor can
refuse payment on account of lack of protest for non-payment, since
the intervener, by accepting the instrument, contracted an unconditional obligation to pay. Even in case an •intervention to pay be involved, the writer does not believe protest is necessary for reasons to
which reference has already been made.
In order to justify the rule stated above, the explanation has been
made that a drawee who has refused to accept a bill may have done so
because of the state of his accounts with the drawer, which did not
justify acceptance. ,After the refusal, the drawee may find himself in a
position to perform the negotiatory obligation, as a consequence of
credit which the drawer has established with regard to him.48 Consequently, the rule in question tends to provide the drawee. another opportunity to make payment on the bill.
In the author's opinion, such opportunity may be offered the drawee
simply by establishing a preference in his favor, when he presents himself to offer payment of the bill in conjunction with other interveners. ·
By eliminating the formality of protest, the holder is saved a useless
expenditure of time and money, in addition to obtaining the same results by a simpler procedure.
Intervention has an optional character, for the holder, when an
acceptance offered either voluntarily by a third party or by an indicated referee in case of need is involved. With respect to payment, it is
provided that, if the holder refuses to accept it, he loses his right to
proceed lJy way of recourse against any one of the obligors who would
have been discharged as a consequence of such payment.49
In Brazil, Bolivia, _Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, the bearer
of a bill retains all his rights against the parties secondarily liable, irrespective of how many times the bill has been accepted for honor.

E. Concurrence of Several lnterveners
In case· several interveners simultaneously present themselves, offering acceptance or payment of a bill, the law has recourse to the right
of preference. In order to know in whose favor this right operates, it
48 BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
982, § 241 (1943).
.
49
u. S.-N.I.L., S.1 176.
Can.-B.E.A., s. 153 (3).
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, art. 177.
Pan.-L. 52 or 1917, art. 176.

NOTES,

Hornbook Series,
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is necessary to distinguish three different cases, according as (a) the interveners all have the character of referees in case of need, (b) the
interveners are voluntary, or ( c) those so presenting themselves are of
both types.
In the first case, it is provided in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay,
Chile, and Honduras that the intervention must first be sought from
the party designated by the drawer, and then from the parties designated by the endorsers, following the order of the endorsements.
The same rule is observed ip. the second case. The person who intervenes for the drawer takes preference, and if there should be interveners in behalf of the endorsers, the intervention offered for the
earliest of these is to be admitted. 50
In the specific case of acceptance for honor, the rule stated does not
have an imperative nature, as in the case of payment. Acceptance for
honor does not preclude the holder from being able to receive the acceptance of any other person who may desire to give it in behalf of one
of the other obligors, nor does it prevent the drawee from giving his
acGeptance after having refused to do so, unless the holder can oppose
some right to reject it. In this instance, the holder only has the right
that the intervener should not be exonerated from the obligation that
he has assumed. 51
In this situation, the Ley de Cambia of Costa Rica provides an exception by enacting in article 9 5:
·

If several persons present themselves to accept a bill for honor,
the acceptance of any one of them shall be allowed provided the
bearer agrees thereto. 52
This provision is subject to criticism because of its vagueness and
lack of precision. We may suppose that the legislature intended to
grant the holder the right to select the obligor who suits him best in case
he is not disposed to require acceptance of all the interveners.
When referees in case of need and spontaneous interveners simul50

Arg.-C. Com., art. 703.
Para.-C. Com., art. 703.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 851.
Chile-C. Com., art. 699.
Hon.-C. Com., art. 597.
C. R.-L. Cam., art. 89.
51
Arg.-C. Com., arts. 699 and- 701.
Para.-C. Com., arts. 699 and 70 I.
Uru.-C. Com., arts. 892 and 894.
52
"Si varios se presentaren a aceptar la letra por intervenci6n, se recibira la
aceptaci6n de todos, siempre que lo admite el portador."
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taneously appear, preference must be given to the former according to
the legislations of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, because the referees in case of need are specifically designated in the bill
for this purpose. In effect, it is understood that, when the interveners
are persons designated beforehand, the holder is under an obligation
to demand acceptance; on the other hand, such action is optional when
the intervener offers to accept on his own initiative. 53
In Chile and Honduras, which do not follow this rule, according to
the precepts established in their respective codifications, preference must
be given in this case, as -in tl).e others, to that person whose intervention
will discharge the greatest number of parties secondarily liable, because
in both types of intervention, required and voluntary, the holder is
under obligation to consent to the acceptance or the payment that is
offered to him.
On the order of preference to be followed, article 412 of the Code
of Commerce of El Salvador provides:
When several persons present themselves prepared to accept
a bill of exchange for honor, then preference shall be given in the
following order:
( r) Those who were designated for this purpose in the bill of
exchange itself;
( 2) Those who, npt satisfying these conditions, present themselves to intervene.
.
Preference among persons who present themselves to accept,
pursuant to a mandate, and ~among those who present themselves
without having been designated, shall be granted to those who discharge the greatest number of obligors from liability.
The rule prescribed in the foregoing clause ( inciso) does not
bind the bearer, but only those persons who present themselves to
accept for honor.
The drawee and the referee in case of need, although they
have refused to accept in such capacity, may intervene as third parties for acceptance. 5 ¼
53

Arg.-C. Com., arts. 656 and 700.
Para.-C. Com., arts. 656 and 700.
Uru.-C. Com., arts. 851 and 893.
C. R.-L. Cam., arts. 89 and 90.
54 "Cuando se presenten varias personas dispuestas a aceptar una letra de cambio,
por intervenci6n, se preferiran en el orden siguiente:
"(1) Las que estuviesen indicadas para ello en la misma letra de cambio.
"(2) Las que se presenten a intervenir, no reuniendo estas circunstancias.
"La preferencia entre las personas que se presenten a aceptar, en virtud del
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Two different situations are contemplated by this law. The first,
when the concurrence occurs among referees in case of need and undesignated third parties. In such case, the holder must give preference
to the former. The second situation arises, when the concurrence is
only among interveners of the same type, either referees in case of need
or voluntary third parties. In this case, there is an obligation to give
preference to the party who is in a position to discharge the greatest
number of obligors on the bill. This obligation is enacted not as respects the holder of the instrument, but for the interveners, consequently leaving the former at liberty to choose the party who suits him
best. This order of preference imposed on the interveners is of doubtful
practical utility. As stated above, the holder must act with entire freedom because it is supposed that he is the only person capable of determining the person who presents the greatest security.
With respect to the order of preference, in Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic, it is enacted that, when several persons
present themselves at the same time offering payment of a bill, preference shall be given the one who proposes to do so for the drawer, and
if all would do so for different endorsers, the one who intervenes for
the earli~st endorser shall be taken. Since the law is silent with respect
to plurality of interveners for acceptance of an instrument, it may be
supposed that the foregoing rule applies by analogy. The law is also
silent in all respects on the case where there are several interveners who
offer to accept or to pay in behalf of the same person. In the first
hypothesis, it is logical to suppose that it is for the holder to make an
election, since he is the person best qualified to judge the solvency of
the different candidates, and who therefore presents the greatest security for the performance of the obligation. In the second hypothesis,
since payment made by any one of the interveners fulfills the same aim
, of discharging the obligation so far as the holder is concerned, the latter
must accept the first payment offered. 55 On this point, the Brazilian law
differs from the other legislations, providing in inciso 3 of article 3 5:
mandato, y entre aquellas que se presenten sin estar indicadas, se otorgara a las que
eximan de responsabilidad a mayor mimero de obligados.
"La regla prescrita en el inciso anterior, no obliga al portador, sino unicamente
a las personas que se presenten a aceptar por intervenci6n.
"Podran intervenir como terceros para la aceptaci6n, el librado y el indicado
para el caso de ser necesario, aunque se hubiesen negado a aceptar en aquel concepto."
55
Provisions concerning intervention:
Bol.-C. Mere., arts. 438, 439, 440, 441, and 442.
Haiti-C. Com., arts. 124, 125, 126, 155, and 156.
Dom.-C. Com., arts. 126, 127, 128, 158, and 159.
Bra.-Dec. 2044, arts. 34 and 35.
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When there are multiple interventions (for payment),
whether or not the parties concurring are co-obligors, the intervener who discharges the greatest number of signatures shall be
preferred.
When there are several interventions fo~ the same signature,
preference shall be given to the intervener who is a co-obligor; in
the absence of the latter, to the drawee; in the absence of both, the
holder or receiving agent shall have the 'option. Intervention is
forbidden to the acceptor and to his respective avaliste. 56
In the. Brazilian law, the disadvantage of assimilating acceptance
by an intervener to acceptance by an ordinary drawee also appears.
Thus, in inciso 2 of article 34, it is stated that the liability on the bill of
such intervener is equivalent to that of a drawee who accepts. 57 As a
result of this equivalence, it is held, according to Carvalho de Mendon~, that performance of the obligation assumed by the intervener
does not constitute a payment by intervention. He pays, then, as one
directly liable on the bill for the obligation, since his signature appears
on the bill of exchange with the express acquiescence of the creditor.58
Such effects can never be attributed to the action of an interv~ner. The
same author cited above, stating that, if an accepter for honor pays a bill
at maturity, he should remain subject to the provisions of article 40,
parrafo unico, virtually admits the impossibility of combining these two
types of acceptance by attributing to them the same results. In substance,
it is prescribed in the P.rovision in question that a voluntary intervener
who pays is subrogated to all the rights of the party whose signature
was honored. Thus, the bill of exchange is not cancelled as a consequence of such act, since by virtue thereof the intervener has to enforce
the rights acquired by subrogation. Payment made by a drawee acceptor, on the contrary, has the effect of extinguishing the negotiable
instrument and, consequently, cannot result in subrogation to the rights
of any of those liable on the bill. The rights which may subsist against
the drawer all have an extra-negotiatory nature.
In article 73 I of the Code of Commerce of Guatemala, it is pro56
"Sendo multiples as interven5;oes, concorram ou nao co-obrigados, deve ser
preferido o interviniente, que desonera maior numero de firmas.
"Multiplas as interven5;oes pela mesma firma, deve ser preferido o interviniente
co-obrigado; na falta deste o sacado; na falta de ambos, o portador ou detentor tern
a op5;ao. E' vedada a interven5;ao ao acceitante, ou ao respectivo avalista."
57 "A responsabilidade cambial deste interviniente e equiparada a do sacado que
acceita."

58

5

CARVALHO DE MENDON~A, TRATADO DE DIREITO COMMERCIAL BRASILEIRO,

3d ed., pt.

2,

318, § 746 (Rio de Janeiro, 1938).
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vided that, in case of concurrence of numerous persons to accept a bill,
one who intervenes for the drawer shall be preferred, and in case all
offer to do so for endorsers, the intervention that favors the earliest of
these shall be accepted.
In the legislations •of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua no express
provision appears on this point'. Therefore, the writer believes that it
has been sought to leave the holder at liberty to choose the one that he
prefers.
In Venezuela, however, another conclusion might apparently be
drawn. It is provided by article 444, paragraph 2, of the Code of
Commerce, that the bearer can refuse acceptance for honor, unless it is
offered by a person designated therefor or for payment in case of need.
Consequently, it must be deduced from this provision that, if various interveners present themselves, the holder will necessarily have to give
the preference to the one who appears indicated in the bill. This is but
appare11;tly so, because there is no doubt that the Venezuelan legislature
desired to adopt the rule established by the Uniform Regulation, according to which the bearer may refuse acceptance for honor even when
a person designated to accept or to pay in case of need offers it; in the
final part of the article referred to, it is stated that, if the bearer admits
the acceptance, he loses the actions and rights of recourse against his
guarantors that pertain to him before maturity. The modification introduced in the corresponding provision of the Uniform Regulation
(article 54) is indisputably due to unjustifiable carelessness in translation, since, as Dr. Morales says:
It would be absurd for the law to impose upon the bearer the
necessity of admitting acceptance by an intervener and at the very
same time to enact the loss of the action and rights of recourse
against his guarantors.59
Respecting the order of preference, the Code of Commerce of Peru,
like the Code of Guatemala, provides that the person by whose acceptance the greatest number of obligors would be discharged from liability,
should preferably be taken.
In Anglo-American law, it may be said that no order of preference
has been established for the case when several acceptors appear; it may
be believed, therefore, that it remains in the discretion of the holder to
select the one most desirable from his point of view. On the e-0ntrary,
59
"Serra absurdo que la ley impusiera al portador la obligatoriedad de la aceptaci6n
del interventor y consagrara al propio tiempo la perdida de las acciones y recursos
contra SUS garantes." CARLOS MORALES, EsTUDJO SOBRE LA LETRA DE CAMBIO EN EL
C6DIGO DE CoMERCIO VENEZOLANO 140 (Caracas, 1935).
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for payment it is provided that, when several persons offer to pay in
honor of different obligors, preference must be given the one whose
payment discharges from liability the greatest number of obligors.
Nothing is said about the case when there appear numerous interveners
who claim to act on behalf of the same obligor. It would seem that in
such a situation the holder should likewise-be left at liberty to select
his debtor. 60
In the codes of commerce of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, it
is provided that an acceptor may assume the position of a party intervening as well as that of one on whose behalf intervention occurs. With
respect to the first situation, it could be noted that, in addition to providing in one provision that a bill of exchange protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, may be accepted or paid by any third party for
the account and honor of the drawer or any other party liable for payment, it is enacted that, if numerous individuals concurrently seek to
intervene in the payment of a bill, the one who intervenes for the
drawee or the drawer will be preferred. 61 Respecting the second case,
the applicable provision reads as follows:
The drawer himself, or any other obligor on the bill, may offer
, to accept or make payment. 62
However, in spite of the content of the provision reproduced above, an
inference to the contrary could be drawn from another rule contained in
the legal codifications in question, i.e., that payment for honor by an
acceptor does not produce the same effects that such act would produce
when performed by any other person. In effect, the rule referred to
provided:
The drawee who, after having refused to accept a bill, pays for
honor of the signature of the drawer, or of any one of the endorsU. S.-N.I.L., s. 174.
Can.-B.E.A., s; 153 (2).
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, art. 175.
Pan.-L. 52 of 1917, art. 174.
61
Arg.-C. Com., arts. 696 and 703.
Para.-C. Com., arts. 696 and 703.
Uru.-C. Com., arts. 889 and 896.

60

With regard to the last mentioned rule it must be noted that the terminology employed is equivocal, since on no occasion could there be an intervention in favor of the
drawee, because a simple drawee is not a negotiatory obligor.
62 "El mismo librador, 6 cualquier otro obligado a las resultas de la letra, puede
ofrecerse para aceptar 6 verificar el pago."
Arg.-C. Com., art. 696, par. 2.
Para.-C. Com., art. 696, par. 2.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 889, par. 2.
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ers, is considered an extraneous intervener, and the provisions of
the preceding article are applicable to him. 68
In the same codes under consideration there is to be found a provision which apparently enacts the equivalence of ordinary acceptance
and acceptance for honor. The provision in question states:
One who accepts a bill for honor remains liable for payment
thereof, as if the bill had been drawn against him, and must give
notice of his acceptance within twenty-four hours or by the second
post.04
We have used the word "apparently," because this provision could
never be taken in an absolute sense. Weighty reasons already con-_
sidered oppose it. 65 Moreover, in other later provisions, the differences
"El girado que, despues de ~aberse negado a aceptar la letra, paga por honor
del librador, 6 de alguno de los endosantes, es considerado como interveiltor
extrafio, y le son aplicables las prescripciones del artfculo precedente/'
Arg.-C. Com., art. 705.
Para.-C. Com., art. 705.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 898.
This article, as it may be appreciated, specifies the only case in which payment
by the intervention of a drawee may produce the same effects as payment by the intervention of any third party. In effect, in referring "to the regulations of the preceding article," this provision points to the rule therein contained, relative to the
effects of payment by intervention.
Arg.-C. Com., art. 704.
Para.-C. Com., art. 704.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 897.
64
"El que acepta una letra por intervenci6n, queda responsable a su pago, como si
hubiese girado la letra a su cargo, y debe dar aviso de su aceptaci6n dentro de las
veinticuatro horas 6 por el segundo correo."
Arg.-C. Com., art. 698.
Para.-C. Com., art. 698.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 891.
65
As set forth earlier in this study, acceptance for honor differs from ordinary
acceptance in the following respects:
(I) The obligation assumed by an acceptor for honor is secondary, since it is
measured by that of the party in whose favor the intervention is made. Accordingly, the
holder should first look to the named drawee for payment and, only on his default, to
the acceptor for honor.
.
(2) Consistently with this, payment by an acceptor for hon0r does not extinguish
a bill of exchange, since he necessarily has a claim for reimbursement on the bill against
the predecessors of the party in whose honor payment is made. Consequently, the rights
accruing to an acceptor for honor on payment, though in some degree measured by,
are not derived by subrogation from the party honored~ but are independently vested in
the intervener.
(3) The period of limitation for the obligation of an acceptor for honor is not
necessarily the same as that of an ordinary acceptor, since demand must be made on the
former within the period allowed for protest, without which the liability of the intervener, as a party secondarily liable, lap.ses.
63

a la firma

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

' between these two types -of acceptance are clearly established.66 Consequently, it would seem that amendment of the provision referred to
would be advantageous so as to prescribe more clearly the effects that
acceptance by.an intervener is capable of producing.

F. Effects of Intervention in General
In Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, and Honduras, acceptance for honor in no wise affects the rights of the bearer
against parties secondarily liable. The fact that the holder has con,sented thereto does not alter in any respect his legal position in regard
to said obligors.67
In substance, article 733, paragraph 3, of the Code of Commerce of
Guatemala provides that, if the holder allows acceptance for honor, he
loses the rights of recourse against his guarantors that belonged to him
before maturity. 'Further on, in article 737, it is provided:
Intervention in the acceptance does not prevent the bearer
from demanding of the drawer and endorsers security, deposit, or
reimbursement according to the provisions of article 671. 68
As may easily be,seen, an intolerable situation results from the tenor of
the two provisions reproduced, a situation that can be attributed only to
unpardonable negligence on the part of the Guatemalan legislature,
who, in adopting the Uniform Regulation in its general lines, introduced some provisions characteristic of other systems, without resolving
the contradictions existing between them. For this reason, incongruities
of the type noted above are frequently found throughout Title XI,
devoted entirely to the Contract of Exchange and Bills of Exchange,
of the Guatemalan Code of Commerce.
In the Mexican law, we find that acceptance for honor extinguishes
only certain of the actions of r,ecourse, namely, those that the holder
66

Arg.-C. Com., arts. 700, 701, 702, and 703.
Para.-C. Com., arts. 700; 701, 702, and 703.
Uru.-C. Com., arts. 892, 893, 894, and 895.
67
Arg.-C. Com., art. 700.
Para.-C. Com., art. 700.
Uru.-C. Com., art. 893.
Chile-C. Com., art. 744.
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 413.
Hon.-C. Com., art. 599.
68 "La intervenci6n en la aceptaci6n no obsta al portador para exigir del librador y
endosantes el afianzamiento, dep6sito o reembolso conforme lo dispuesto en al artfculo

671!'

.
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had against the person in whose honor the intervention occurred and
the subsequent endorsers and their avalistes ( article Io5).
In the Anglo-American system, the difference between ordinary acceptance and payment, and acceptance and payment for-honor, is expressly recognized. To the latter acts, a secondary character is attributed, subordinating payment for honor to the drawing of a protest
for non-payment even when the bill has previously been accepted by an
intervener .69
The writer agrees that the obligations resulting from intervention
are of a secondary character, since they can never be confused with the
principal obligation contracted by the drawee. The effects of an acceptance for honor especially involve the suspension, or, more precisely, the
elimination of the actions to which non-acceptance by the drawee gives
rise, for the benefit of all or some of those secondarily liable.
The laws of none of these countries contain a specific provision respecting the right of recourse. Nevertheless, it has been considered,
both in doctrine and in practice, that if the holder admits the acceptance
that the intervener offers him, he loses his right to proceed by way of
recourse for non-acceptance by the drawee against the person in whose
favor the act took place and against subsequent obligors. If the acceptance was given in favor of all the obligors, he cannot sue any one of
them by way of recourse, until the maturity of the bill and then only
upon dishonor. 70
69

U. S.-N.I.L., ss. 165 and 167.

Can.-B.E.A., s. 152.
Col.-L. 46 of 1923, arts. 166 and 168.
Pan.-L. of 52 of 1917, arts. 165 and. 167.
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